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PROJECT FINANCE INVESTORS: SOLUTION TO POPULISMO
Jenny Small*

I. INTRODUCTION
"I saw other people wrapped in flames jump from the plane. I was in
seat number 21, a window seat at wing level. The doors would not open,
so I jumped through a hole in the plane amid the flames from a height of
about two yards. ... I don't know how I survived."1 This vivid description
came from a witness’s account of the 1998 Cuban airplane crash in
Quito, Ecuador.2 After takeoff, the airplane’s engines stalled due to the
high elevation, making the airplane unable to receive enough lift to clear
the surrounding mountains and volcanoes.3 The plane spiraled
downwards and eventually crashed into a nearby soccer field where
young children were playing.4 The plane exploded leaving few
survivors.5
This crash and many others occurred at the old Mariscal Sucre airport
in Quito, Ecuador.6 The severely dangerous conditions of that airport
compelled the city to relocate the airport.7 The new Mariscal Sucre
airport began operating in February of 2013,8 providing the city and the
nation with hopes beyond avoiding safety problems. Indeed, they also
hoped it would solve the country’s crippling poverty9 and moribund
economy.10 While Ecuador has a vast amount of natural resources, forty
percent of the country’s population suffers from poverty to the point that
they are barely surviving. This high level of poverty shows that a
nation’s potential has little value without a supporting infrastructure.11

*

J.D. Boston University School of Law, 2013.
Dozens Dead in Ecuador Crash, BBC (Aug. 30, 1998),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/161030.stm.
2
Id.
3
77 Die in Crash of Cuban Jet in Ecuador, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 1998),
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/30/world/77-die-in-crash-of-cuban-jet-in-ecuador.html.
4
Dozens Dead in Ecuador Crash, supra note 1.
5
Id.
6
Gonzalo Solano, Mariscal Sucre, Quito’s Airport, to be Moved Feb. 19 (Photos),
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 30, 2013, 2:50 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/30/mariscalsucre-quitos-air_n_2582582.html.
7
See Joe Bates, New Era for Quito: $700 Million Airport Set to Open, AIRPORT WORLD (Oct.
25, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://www.airport-world.com/item/2006-new-era-for-quito.
8
See id.
9
See Mercedes Alvaro, Ecuador’s Poverty Rate Fell to 28.6% in 2011 vs. 32.8% in 2010,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2012, 1:38 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20120117-712857.html.
10
Nathan Gill, Ecuador Economic Growth Stagnates as Oil Drop Cuts Spending, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 9, 2013, 3:49 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-09/ecuador-economic-growthstagnates-as-oil-drop-cuts-spending-1-.html.
11
See generally Ecuador es un imán para las inversiones también, TELÉGRAFO (Apr. 1, 2013),
http://www.telegrafo.com.ec/economia/item/ecuador-es-un-iman-para-las-inversiones-tambien.html.
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The new airport became the first step towards addressing the gap
between Ecuador’s potential and its struggling infrastructure.12 The
airport seeks to connect Ecuador to world markets and provide a catalyst
for further investment in domestic infrastructure.13 Nonetheless, the vast
resources, new airport, and other supporting infrastructure are not fully
utilized because foreign investors perceive the risk of Ecuador’s
populism as outweighing any potential gains.14
Populism is a significant political risk for entrepreneurs in Ecuador.
However, entrepreneurs can mitigate the risks of populism through
project finance, learning from the experiences of the new airport in Quito
(Quiport), and adopting a strong stabilization clause.15 This paper first
describes the largely unexploited opportunity for investment in
Ecuador.16 These unexploited opportunities include the abundant natural
resources extending from the coast of Esmeraldas to the interior
Amazon.17 Although the government provides incentives for developing
these resources, many investors have not heeded the call.18
Investor neglect of Ecuador, as Part III will explain, derives from a
fear of populism.19 Populism is a growing trend under the leadership of
the President of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, who has shown a commitment
to redistributing wealth, enacting laws that exploit foreign companies,
and challenging a perceived global power imbalance.20 Correa’s actions,
such as his 2010 decree that foreign oil companies must promote state
policies and submit at least seventy percent of their revenues to the
state,21 have become a calculated risk for investors in Ecuador.22
Investors, however, should not allow such risk to entirely deter
them.23 They can reconcile the potential benefits of investment with the
risks associated with populism by using project finance.24 Part IV
describes how use of project finance can allocate risk and utilize
12

See discussion infra Part V.A.
See discussion infra Part V.A.
See generally Andres Oppenheimer, Latin America’s Fastest-Growing Economies of 2013,
MIAMI HERALD (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/04/24/3362939/andresoppenheimer-latin-americas.html; see also James McKeigue, Ecuador: Is it Nuts to Invest Here?,
MONEYWEEK (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.moneyweek.com/investments/stock-markets/emergingmarkets/new-world-why-you-should-be-getting-excited-about-ecuador-62904.
15
See discussion infra Parts III–VI.
16
See discussion infra Part II.
17
See discussion infra Part II.
18
See discussion infra Part II.
19
See discussion infra Part III.
20
See discussion infra Part III.
21
See Jason Pierce, Note, A South American Energy Treaty: How the Region Might Attract
Foreign Investment in a Wake of Resource Nationalism, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 417, 431 (2011); see
also Ecuador: Correa’s Play for Greater Influence in the Oil Sector, FORBES (Apr. 21, 2010, 4:20
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/energysource/2010/04/21/ecuador-correas-play-for-greaterinfluence-in-the-oil-sector/.
22
See Sara Schaefer Muňoz & Mercedes Alvaro, Ecuador’s Correa Poised to Broaden his
Sway, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 15, 2013, 6:40 PM),http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873244
32004578304611096042632.html; but see Sara Miller Llana, Ecuador’s Populist Leader Still
Strong, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 26, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/
2009/0426/p06s07-woam.html (explaining that “Correa is more difficult to categorize”).
23
See generally discussion infra Part IV.
24
See discussion infra Part IV.
13
14
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expected cash flows to fund a venture, which allows the project to
sustain itself on its merits.25 Part V demonstrates the merits of project
finance in Ecuador by exemplifying the Quiport project.26 The project
addressed a need, furthered the nation’s goals, and overcame a
manifestation of populism through a constitutional challenge.27 Finally,
Part VI offers the specific recommendation, based on the Quiport project,
that project financiers should employ stabilization clauses.28
II. OPPORTUNITY FOR INVESTMENT: ECUADOR’S RESOURCES
Ecuador is located at the equator and boasts a beautiful coastline,
mountains, and a sliver of the Amazon rainforest. The country possesses
a myriad of resources, some of which the world has not yet even
discovered and many that have not reached their full potential.29 For
instance, Ecuador’s cloud forests possess trees that bleed when cut.30
This blood-like sap can heal wounds, and possibly even prevent the
growth of cancer.31 The first investor to capitalize on Ecuador’s
incredible resources stands to gain large financial benefits from such an
investment.32 For Ecuador, the resources present an opportunity to evolve
in a globalized economy.33 Nonetheless, Ecuador lacks the ability to
make this kind of economic progression because neither the government
nor foreign investors have made the needed investment in the country’s
infrastructure.34
To support a resource driven economy in the future, Ecuador must
have sustainability and diversification of its resources.35 First, Ecuador
must sustain its economy by preserving its primary export—oil.36 The
nation currently produces only a small portion of its oil,37 even though it
has the “third-largest oil reserves in South America after Venezuela and
25

See discussion infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Part V.
See discussion infra Part V.
28
See discussion infra Part VI.
29
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2012 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT- ECUADOR
(2012).
30
Chris Kilham, Dragon’s Blood for Skin Issues, FOX NEWS LATINO (May 1, 2011),
http://latino.foxnews.mobi/quickPage.html?page=30422&content=51372751&pageNum=-1; see
generally Manuel Sandoval et al., Sangre de Grado Croton Palanostigma Induces Apoptosis in
Human Gastrointestinal Cancer Cells, 80 J. ETHNO-PHARMACOLOGY 121 (2002).
31
Kilham, supra note 30; see generally Sandoval, supra note 30.
32
See Clive Cookson, How to Make the Most of ‘Wild Wealth’, FT MAG. (Mar. 29, 2013, 6:21
PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/168acd56-967a-11e29ab200144feabdc0.html#axzz2RiwUe7IU.
33
See generally Pierce, supra note 21, at 417–18.
34
See supra notes 56–11 and accompanying text.
35
Fander Falconi, Ecuador Begins to Roar, GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2013, 1:15 PM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/apr/07/ecuador-begins-to-roar; see also John Vidal,
Oil: Can Ecuador See Past the Black Stuff?, GUARDIAN (Sept. 28, 2010, 6:18 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2010/sep/28/ecuador-oil-extractionamazon-yasuni; see generally Analia Murias, First Concession Granted for Mariculture, FIS (Apr.
9, 2013, 11:40 PM), http://www.fis.com/fis/worldnews/worldnews.asp?l=e&country=0&special=
&monthyear=&day=&id=60014&ndb=1&df=0.
36
See generally Vidal, supra note 35.
37
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ECUADOR: BACKGROUND (2012); see also Vidal, supra note 35.
26
27
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Brazil.”38 While oil is an important resource to Ecuador’s economy,39 it
has become Ecuador’s “resource curse,” impairing the rest of the
economy as a result of Ecuador’s over reliance on it.40 To regenerate the
economy, Ecuador joined with the United Nations to begin the YasuníITT development initiative in 2007 to reduce its oil exploitation,
especially in biologically diverse areas like the Amazon.41 As of March
2013, participants have contributed USD $64 million and pledged USD
$187 million.42
Second, besides rationing its oil, Ecuador must continue to focus on
its other industries.43 For instance, Ecuador has marketed its traditional
exports of coffee, chocolate, and bananas, for which it became
synonymous with the label of “banana republic” for so many years.44 In
addition, according to a March 2012 draft document, Ecuador estimated
that agriculture would continue to economically provide for its rural
population.45 Agricultural exports are particularly significant to Ecuador
because of the nation’s geostrategic location near major markets like the
United States.46 With such proximity, Ecuador is highly competitive
against other exporters because even if other nations can match its cheap
labor, Ecuador’s transportation costs are often lower.47
Finally, Ecuador must develop new marketable resources to sustain
its economy.48 In characterizing this prong of its development, Ecuador’s
National Secretary of Planning and Development declared that they
planned to reduce their reliance on “neoliberal recipes of privatisation” in
favor of their “innovative financial models to overcome the threat of
crises; and in new conceptions of good living, based on social and
environmental sustainability.”49 The Secretary remains vague, however,

38
Update 1-Ecuador Oil Output Up 0.8 Percent in 2012, Under Target, REUTERS (Jan. 11,
2013, 12:34 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/11/ecuador-oilidUSL1E9CB49M20130111; Ecuador Facts and Figures, ORG. OF THE PETROLEUM EXP.
COUNTRIES, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/148.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2013); U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 37.
39
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 29 (describing oil as one of Ecuador’s “strategic sectors”).
40
Vidal, supra note 35.
41
John Vidal, Project to Leave Oil in Ground Under Yasuní Park Reaches $300M, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 23, 2012, 5:37 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/nov/23/yasuni-oilground-project.
42
Id.
43
See generally Oficina de Evaluación Independiente, República del Ecuador: Evaluación del
Programa en el País 4 (June 10, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Fondo Internacional de
Desarrollo Agrícola).
44
Id.; but see John SanBrailo, Ecuador: Never a Banana Republic, LATIN BUS. CHRON. (May
29, 2012), http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/app/article.aspx?id=5689.
45
Oficina de Evaluación Independiente, supra note 43.
46
Carlos E. Ludena & Sara Wong, Presentation at the Ninth Annual Conference on Global
Economic Analysis, Domestic Support Policies for Agriculture in Ecuador and the U.S.-Andean
Countries Free Trade Agreement: An Applied General Equilibrium Assessment 4 (June 2006),
available at https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/2580.pdf.
47
See generally MICHAEL REID, FORGOTTEN CONTINENT: THE BATTLE FOR LATIN AMERICA’S
SOUL 301 (2007).
48
Diversificar la economía de Ecuador es el nuevo desafío del reelecto de Ecuador, AMÉRICA
ECONOMIA (Feb. 18, 2013, 6:47 PM), http://www.americaeconomia.com/economiamercados/finanzas/diversificar-la-economia-el-nuevo-desafio-del-reelecto-correa.
49
Falconi, supra note 35.
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as to the nature of other financial models.50 While the approach attempts
to further pursue wealth redistribution strategies,51 Ecuador has at least
shown some signs that it would like to attract foreign investment to
cultivate other industries.52 For example, in March 2013, Ecuador
promulgated a four-year plan to attract foreign direct investment with the
hope of increasing foreign investment by fifteen to twenty percent.53 In
the plan, Ecuador identifies the main sectors for investment as tourism,
metal fabrication, petroleum, pharmacy, renewable energy, applied
software, and agriculture.54 As a result of the plan and other conditions,
the United States Department of State has reported that Ecuador is
“relatively open to foreign investment in most sectors.”55
Despite the competitive resources and intent to diversify, Ecuador and
other Latin American nations generally lack the infrastructure they need
to exploit and market these resources.56 While Latin America hosts about
twenty bids for USD $31.6 billion in infrastructure projects,57 the
International Project Finance Association estimates that the region still
needs USD $800 billion worth of investment within five years to foster
its infrastructure.58 Due to this, neither the governments nor private
parties have invested in the infrastructure necessary to support resource
development.59
This problem is common amongst many Latin American
governments.60 While Ecuador and other Latin governments provide
enticing investments, private investors have generally failed to contribute
to the Latin American infrastructure.61 The world has focused on
development in other regions like Africa and it has largely overlooked
Latin America, despite its copious resources.62 At a Council on Foreign
Relations discussion in November 2012, panelists lamented the world’s
50

See id.
Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa Says Citizens Will be in Charge, Not Money, GUARDIAN
(Feb. 18, 2013, 6:10 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/18/ecuador-presidentheralds-citizen-revolution.
52
See generally Ecuador es un imán para las inversiones también, supra note 11.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 29.
56
U.N. ECON. COMMISSION FOR LATIN AM. AND THE CARIBBEAN, The Economic
Infrastructure Gap in Latin America and the Caribbean, 293 BULLETIN FAL 1 (2011), available at
http://www.cepal.org/usi/noticias/bolfall/6/42926/FAL-293-WEB-ENG-2.pdf; see also Pierce, supra
note 21, at 418.
57
Infrastructure Bids in Latin America, LATIN BUS. CHRON. (Oct. 18, 2012),
http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/app/article.aspx?id=5786.
58
IPFA UK: London: The Latin America Infrastructure Market, INT’L PROJECT FIN. ASS’N,
http://www.ipfa.org/events/6792/ipfa-uk-london-the-latin-america-infrastructure-market (last visited
Mar. 4, 2013); see also Bates, supra note 7.
59
See Pierce, supra note 21, at 418.
60
See Krista Hughes & Lomi Kriel, Latin America Taps Private Sector for Infrastructure
Needs, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 17, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-03-17/news/sns-rtiadbinfrastructurel1n0c9003-20130317_1_private-sector-infrastructure-iadb.
61
Gillian White, Booming Latin America Being Ignored, Experts Say, MARKET WATCH (Nov.
19, 2012), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2012-11-19/investing/35250233_1_van-agtmaeleconomic-outlook-latin-america.
62
REID, supra note 47, at 1 (“Scarcely a month goes by without some political leader or aging
rock star urging the citizens of the world’s richer countries to do something to aid Africa .... But
what of Latin America, the other great region of the developing world?”).
51
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“benign neglect” of market opportunities in Latin America.63
Recognizing this “neglect,” the World Bank stated that Latin America
has slower development than other comparable areas.64 Moreover,
foreign direct investment in Latin America is significantly less than
foreign direct investment in Asia.65 In fact, in 2012, foreign direct
investment in Ecuador actually decreased.66 The scarcity of investment
has required Ecuador to stray from its strategic economic goals and
entertain its only potential suitor, China, with its demands for oil.67 Thus,
like many other Latin American countries, Ecuador only has the
resources to support its economy if it can attract investors to develop the
needed infrastructure.
III. CHALLENGES WITH INVESTING IN ECUADOR: POPULISM
Although Ecuador’s rich resources are appealing, investors fear that
the appeal is nothing but a siren’s call because of the populism risks that
could potentially negate any benefit.68 Recognizing such risks,
Moneyweek reporter, James McKeigue, claims that investors “would
have to be nuts to invest in Ecuador.”69 He states that the resulting
populism from Correa’s “citizens’ revolution” is a major reason to forego
investment.70 His concern, shared by others, is that populism can lead to
the nationalization of businesses and industries as well as changes in
national laws that adversely affect businesses.71 The basis for his fear is
the growing trend of populism in South America.72 In Ecuador, Correa
has embarked on a citizens’ revolution that is similar to other populist
nations in the region, adjusted the domestic power balance, and
attempted to threaten the global status quo.73
63

White, supra note 61; see also REID, supra note 47, at 4.
Infrastructure in Latin America & the Caribbean: Recent Developments and Key
Challenges, WORLD BANK (Aug. 31, 2005), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
COUNTRIES/LACEXT/0,,contentMDK:20631899~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:2585
54,00.html.
65
World Investment Report 2012: Towards a Generation of Investment Policies, UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (June 2012),
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2012overview_en.pdf.
66
La inversión extranjera en Ecuador baja 36,4%, EL UNIVERSO (July 25, 2012),
http://www.eluniverso.com/2012/07/25/1/1356/inversion-extranjera-ecuador-baja-364.html.
67
Eduardo Garcia & Charlie Zhu, China’s CNP in Talks with Ecuador Over $12.5 Billion
Refinery, REUTERS (July 20, 2012, 12:41 PM), http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/07/20/us-ecuadorrefinery-cnpc-idINBRE86J08C20120720; see Jonathan Kaiman, Ecuador Auctions Off Amazon to
Chinese Oil Firms, GUARDIAN (Mar. 26, 2013, 1:16 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/26/ecuador-chinese-oil-bids-amazon.
68
See LaKindra Mohr, Of Note: Is the Populist Left in Latin America Bad for Business in the
Region?, 27 SAIS REV. 17, 17–19 (2007); see also Robert Looney, Morales Walks the Populist High
Wire, FOREIGN POLICY (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/26/morales_
walks_the_populist_high_wire; see also Pierce, supra note 21, at 423.
69
McKeigue, supra note 14.
70
Id.
71
Id.; see also Pierce, supra note 21, at 431.
72
See The Return of Populism, ECONOMIST (Apr. 12, 2006),
http://www.economist.com/node/6802448.
73
See generally Pierce, supra note 21, at 424; Gabriela Molina & Gonzalo Solano, Ecuador’s
Triumphant Correa Vows to Deepen ‘Citizen’s Revolution’ Following Landslide, NBC NEWS (Feb.
64
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Ecuador’s citizens’ revolution is only one instance of populism
festering in Latin America.74 Latin America’s vision of populism, first
articulated by former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez,75 revives an
1800s dream of South American nations joining together to restore the
global power balance.76 Chavez, in particular, envisioned a return to
Gran Colombia to empower the South American peoples to challenge the
world elite.77 The nation of Gran Colombia consisted of what is now
Ecuador, Venezuela, Panama, Colombia, and parts of Brazil and Peru.
Gran Colombia was a nation that lasted only a few years, but continues
to endure in the hearts of its disciples.78 This vision is a form of
populism. Generally, populism is manifested as the will of the people
against a state government.79 In South America, populism is manifested
as the will of the people against world powers.80 More recently this has
become known as Chavismo81 and is part of the Bolivarian Revolution.82
Ecuador has become a cosponsor of Chavez’s vision.83 In 2006, the
people of Ecuador elected Correa as president and have reelected him
twice since.84 His prior role as a finance minister and reputation as an
economist contributed to the people’s perception that he was an outsider
to political corruption.85 Moreover, his promises of “participatory
democracy” enamored the people of Ecuador.86 His ascent brought
stability to Ecuador, after more than a decade in which every elected
president had succumbed to political challenges and prematurely

18, 2013, 9:33 AM), http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/18/17002500-ecuadorstriumphant-correa-vows-to-deepen-citizens-revolution-following-landslide?lit.
74
Molina & Solano, supra note 73; see generally The Return of Populism, supra note 72.
75
Doug Bandow, With Hugo Chavez Dead, Will Chavismo Also Die?, FORBES (Mar. 7, 2013,
8:19 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2013/03/07/with-hugo-chavez-dead-willchavismo-also-die/.
76
See Franklin Foer, The Talented Mr. Chávez, ATLANTIC (May 1, 2006, 12:00 PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/05/the-talented-mr-chvez/304809/?single_page=true.
77
Id.
78
See generally Matthew Brown, Not Forging Nations, but Foraging for them: Uncertain
Collective Identities in Gran Colombia, 12 NATIONS & NATIONALISM 223, 226 (2006); see also
REID, supra note 47, at 64.
79
See The Return of Populism, supra note 72; see also REID, supra note 47, at 160, 279.
80
See REID, supra note 47, at 160, 279 (“Chavez himself claims that his ‘Bolivarian
revolution’ is continental in scope.”).
81
See Hugo Chavez’s Rotten Legacy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573106-appeal-populist-autocracy-has-been-weakenednot-extinguished-hugo-ch%C3%A1vezs-rotten.
82
Frank M. Walsh, The Legal Death of the Latin American Democracy: Bolivarian Populism’s
Model for Centralizing Power, Eliminating Political Opposition, and Undermining the Rule of Law,
16 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 241, 244 (2010) (“Hugo Chávez refers to his political philosophy as the
Bolivarian Revolution. The movement repackages populism.”); see also Walter Molano, Latin
America, Its Emerging Markets and the Global, 6 J. INT’L. BUS. & L. 51, 53 (2007).
83
CARLOS DE LA TORRE, POPULIST SEDUCTION IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ECUADORIAN
EXPERIENCE 175 (2010) (describing President Correa as “the embodiment of the citizens’
revolution.”).
84
Id. at 174.
85
Id. at 177–79.
86
Id. at 174; see also William Neuman, President Correa Handily Wins Re-election in
Ecuador, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/18/world/americas/rafaelcorrea-wins-re-election-in-ecuador.html.
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terminated their tenure.87 Prior to Correa, Ecuador had a reputation as a
rather unstable nation with “the average life of Ecuador’s constitution ...
[being] just ten years ... [and] the average president [lasting] in office no
more than two years.”88 Correa has reinvented Ecuador’s reputation in a
new light as a stable nation that embraces populism.89
Correa has done a number of things to establish populism in Ecuador.
In a nation where much of the population (roughly forty percent) lives in
poverty, Correa’s policies of public spending have empowered him.90 He
has reduced the poverty level by about five percent since 2007 by taking
a larger share of the wealthiest ten percent’s income.91 Correa also
employed a prototypical populist tool by enacting a law that appropriated
seventy percent of the nation’s oil income in 2010 for government use.92
By the end of the discussions between the government and the
companies, Ecuador’s government had laid claim to nearly eighty
percent of the oil revenues.93 The law also allowed the government to
fully nationalize the oil industry if any private company violated
Ecuador’s domestic laws.94 For example, the government recently
enacted a law that requires all companies to promote Ecuador’s
governmental policies.95 Correa enacted this law without legislative
review, thereby demonstrating a disregard for domestic opposition.96 To
justify his actions, Correa’s government claimed that investors had
breached their contracts.97 Similarly, Correa has targeted landholders
with the promise to redistribute “idle” land to the poor.98 Such policies
will likely adversely affect the very banana industry that has been a pillar
to Ecuador’s economy.99
Emboldened by his domestic experience, Correa further developed
populism in Ecuador when he signaled his capacity to directly confront

87
In depth Ecuador: A Recent History of Ecuador, CBC NEWS (Apr. 22, 2005) (on file with
author); see also Arthur Brice, Ecuador’s Correa Claims Re-election Win, CNN (Apr. 27, 2009),
9:08 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/04/26/ecuador.election/; DE LA TORRE,
supra note 83, at 177 (“Ecuador has become synonymous with political instability.”).
88
REID, supra note 47, at 24.
89
Pierce, supra note 21, at 430 (“Furthermore, the Ecuadorian climate for foreign investment
has been increasingly unattractive since President Rafael Correa took office.”).
90
Brice, supra note 87.
91
See Daniel Wagner & Giorgio Cafiero, Will Rafael Correa Inherit the Leadership of Latin
American Socialism?, INT’L POL’Y DIG. (Mar. 2, 2013), http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/
2013/03/02/will-rafael-correa-inherit-the-leadership-of-latin-american-socialism.
92
Pierce, supra note 21, at 431.
93
Id.
94
Ecuador President Imposes Oil Nationalization Law, BUSINESS WEEK (July 24, 2010, 5:48
PM), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9H5LVA00.htm.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
See Pierce, supra note 21, at 431.
98
Correa Pledges Land Distribution, Media Clamp but Also Mining Law to Attract Investors,
MERCOPRESS (Feb. 19, 2013, 5:34 AM), http://en.mercopress.com/2013/02/19/correa-pledges-landdistribution-media-clamp-but-also-mining-law-to-attract-investors; Eduardo Garcia & Brian
Ellsworth, Ecuador’s Correa Enjoys Re-election, Seeks Investment, REUTERS (Feb. 18, 2013, 9:47
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world powers.100 In 2012, he demonstrated his willingness to challenge
the status quo at a global level.101 The opportunity arose when WikiLeak
creator, Julian Assange, absconded from Sweden after receiving charges
of rape and sexual assault.102 Assange also faced potential prosecution in
the United States for conspiracy to release classified information.103 In
England, Assange would have faced extradition to Sweden, but Ecuador
offered him asylum in its embassy.104 This asylum may not signify any
real shift in the global political balance, but it does reveal Ecuador’s
willingness to confront other governments even on petty matters.105
Correa has also demonstrated populism by distancing Ecuador and its
resources from traditional international investment enforcement
mechanisms.106 Correa blames much of Ecuador’s dismal economy on
the trade and development policies of international financial institutions
and has begun to eschew the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund.107 His efforts to liberate Ecuador include withdrawal from the
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
and from bilateral investment treaties (BIT).108 Ecuador acted upon a
breadth of criticism that the international frameworks for resolving
disputes disproportionately favor investors over the emerging nations.109
Even if the criticism is valid, Ecuador did a disservice to itself and its
people. At a time when Ecuador hopes to diversify its economy, its
actions are likely to alienate the very investors it needs.110
Correa’s actions only serve to magnify investors’ fears of
expropriation, nationalization, and other ex-post contractual
100
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renegotiations that often occur in populist nations.111 Investors worry that
they will spend their money to develop a resource only to be told by
Ecuador that they cannot benefit from their investment.112 Investors have
witnessed such tactics113 across Latin America.114 Without the traditional
international investment protections,115 investors may find the risks of
populism surpass any potential benefits of investing in Ecuador.116
IV. INVESTORS’ SOLUTION TO POPULISM: PROJECT FINANCE
Despite the disappointing political reality for investors in Ecuador,
individuals can still make profitable investments by using project
finance.117 Project finance can help investors mitigate political risks,
realize the benefits of investment, and align their interests with
Ecuador’s long-term goals.118 Because project finance is dependent on
the projects’ cash flow without recourse to financial contributors,
investors can pursue projects based on the projects’ merits without the
risks of populism overshadowing the benefits.119
Although project finance has existed since the early days of the
Roman Empire, it has become a significant financial model for major,
long-term infrastructure projects.120 A recent example of project
financing was the construction of the Eurotunnel connecting London and
Paris.121 The Eurotunnel, also known as the Chunnel, is a railway under
the English Channel that innovators imagined in the 1800s, long before
the necessary technology existed.122 The sponsors adopted project
financing with a concession agreement and a set of contracts.123 Despite
problems such as underestimated costs and the need to restructure the
concession agreement because of delays, the project was a success.124
111
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The Eurotunnel project demonstrates how investors can capitalize on
their dreams using project finance.125
The two major benefits of project finance are the use of cash flows
and the distribution of risk.126 Project finance allows various sponsors to
advance a project based on the expected cash flows of the project as the
return on the investment.127 In other words, “project financing is lending
based ‘on the merits of a project rather than the credit of the project
sponsor.’”128 Structurally, project finance involves an independent
company, or special project vehicle, that exists for only the term of the
project.129 Through this vehicle, sponsors arrange for contributions of
equity and borrow money with the promise of cash flows from the
project.130 Lenders generally have no recourse against any particular
company because, as explained above, their return is based on the
expected cash flow of the project, not a particular company.131 Sponsors
that contribute a large portion of the equity will see a return on their
investment when the project begins to realize profits.132 In contrast, when
using corporate finance, usually the original company is entirely
responsible for funding the project.133
Using cash flows from the project benefits the financiers in various
ways.134 For instance, cash flows incentivize management to behave
efficiently in order to seize profits from the project.135 Moreover, project
finance’s use of cash flows as the return on investment reduces the risk
that the borrower might default strategically because the cash flows are
“verifiable” and all creditors can monitor them.136 In contrast, should the
borrower attempt to default on the money it owes lenders under a
corporate finance model, the lenders’ primary option is typically to
foreclose on any security interest it may have.137 Simply put, project
finance lenders do not depend on the borrower for the money, but rather,
they depend on the project and its success.138
Project financing distributes the risks among the participants.139 Most
infrastructure projects carry substantial risks given the duration of the
125
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project, the need to collaborate with host governments, and the
accompanying political environments.140 Project finance contracts allow
parties to determine which party will cover certain risks and creates
assurances just in case one or more parties fail to complete specific
aspects of the project.141 For example, many project finance contracts
contain force majeure clauses to mitigate the costs of unforeseen
disasters.142 Accordingly, the incentives of expected cash flows and the
risk shifting mechanism of project financing would be particularly
valuable for handling a project in Ecuador where risks are amplified by
populism.143
V. EXAMPLE OF PROJECT FINANCE IN ECUADOR: QUIPORT
The Quiport project demonstrates how project finance can resolve
investment difficulties in populist nations like Ecuador. Quiport involved
construction of a new airport and the infrastructure to alleviate safety and
business concerns caused by the old airport in Quito, Ecuador.144
A. Benefits & Goals
A new airport was not just another infrastructure project for Quito,
but rather, it was a response to a dangerous situation and an opportunity
to open up the country to world markets.145 By accepting the need for a
new airport, the nation also dared to dream, envisioning the new airport
as part of its greater development ambitions.146 With access to more
locations and better infrastructure, Ecuador could support global cargo
and become a regional hub.147
Part of Ecuador’s vision for a new airport was to fix the defects of the
old airport, including its safety and business issues.148 The old airport’s
location was dangerous.149 The airport was built at a high elevation and
140
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had a short landing strip situated between mountains and volcanoes.150 If
an airplane missed the precariously placed runway, the pilot would have
to then quickly maneuver to avoid the mountains. 151 At such a high
elevation, the thin air could cause the engines to stall and the wings to
receive minimal lift.152 To make matters worse, Quito’s buildings were
just a few feet away from the airport’s runway.153 As a result of these
issues, the airport suffered at least ten “serious accidents” since its
opening in 1960.154 Additionally, these issues made travel to or from
Quito cumbersome and inconvenient.155 For instance, many airlines had
to fly through Guayaquil, Ecuador to refuel, which created additional
costs and delays in travel.156
The new airport not only addressed safety concerns, but it also
supported Ecuador’s ambitions to become a “regional hub” by enabling
access to more destinations.157 For example, with the new airport built at
an elevation of 7,000 feet instead of 9,000 feet, airplanes can now carry
enough fuel to travel greater distances.158 The new runway is more
expansive than the last, which allows larger cargo aircrafts to land and in
turn provides Ecuadorian goods greater access to world markets.159
Quiport also supports the goal of transforming Quito into a South
American commerce center,160 including plans of routing cargo between
Quito and Chicago.161 In 2012, the World Bank reported that Latin
America had a very small market share of global air traffic,162 with only
four airports in the top one hundred, and that the new Mariscal Sucre was
the only international airport being built in South America at the time.163
To capitalize on the dearth of competitors, however, the new airport had
150
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to be able to facilitate traffic and cargo from other areas in South
America.164 To accommodate such a large project, designers had to
develop supporting infrastructure, including a new six-lane highway.165
Additional plans have been made to develop the infrastructure
connecting the different airports around the country.166 The new airport
project evolved beyond its original safety focus and became a gateway to
Ecuador’s economic development and South America’s connection to the
global economy.167
B. Project & Financial Structure
Quiport is a joint venture with Canada’s Aecon Construction Group
and Brazil’s Andrade Gutierrez as some of the main sponsors.168 These
companies joined together to develop the airport and supporting
infrastructure, which cost roughly USD $700 million after the initial
estimate of USD $586 million.169 Quiport employed many different
avenues to pay for the project including debt, equity, and net cash flows
from the operation.170 The lenders include Corporación Aeropuerto y
Zona Franca del Distrito Metropolitano de Quito (“CORPAQ”),
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (“OPIC”), Export-Import Bank
of the United States of America (“EXIM”), the InterAmerican
Development Bank (“IADB”), and Canada’s Export Development
Corporation (EDC).171 OPIC alone committed to provide up to USD
$200 million in financing.172
In conformity with the project finance model, the set of contracts
divided the responsibilities, expectations, and rewards into a concession
agreement for thirty-five years.173 Quiport had a finance agreement with
OPIC, a credit agreement with EXIM, loan agreements with IDB and
EDC, and a master security accounts agreement.174 The currency control
164
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is an example of Quiport sponsors thoroughly addressing as many
foreseeable risks as possible, especially considering that the sponsors
already had a protection against inflation with Ecuador currently using
the U.S. dollar as its currency.175
As the project progressed, the most significant provisions became
those associated with expected cash flows.176 The expected cash flows
derived from projections about the traffic, all fees (both commercial and
regulated), and other operating costs.177 Quiport contracted to manage the
airport and pay the city of Quito eleven percent of the regulated
revenues, which include airline landing fees and passenger departure
fees.178 These fees later became the basis for dispute.179
C. Risks Defined & Realized
Although Quiport sponsors pursued strong organizational and
financial structures through contracts, the project still faced the risks of
political protests and delays.180 These risks materialized in 2010 when an
armed group, protesting salary issues, took control of the airport and
compelled it to shut down.181 In addition to the risk of delays and protest,
Quiport investors also had to overcome a populist constitutional
challenge to the distribution of income from airport fees, which emerged
after the project was underway.182
Ecuador demanded that the investors comply with the country’s new
constitution regardless of their contract’s express provisions.183 The
General Comptroller classified the airport’s service fees as taxes and
claimed that they were not subject to a private entity’s control.184 In
agreement, the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court declared the Quiport
concession agreement unconstitutional.185 In its holding, the court
175

See MYRIAM QUISPE-AGNOLI & ELENA WHISLER, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA,
OFFICIAL DOLLARIZATION AND THE BANKING SYSTEM IN ECUADOR AND EL SALVADOR 55 (2006),
available at https://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/erq306_quispe.pdf; DELOITTE, ECUADOR:
INTERNATIONAL TAX AND BUSINESS GUIDE 2 (2009), http://www.deloitte.com/assets/DcomEcuador/Local%20Assets/Documents/Nuevos%20estudios/Doing%20Business%20in%20Ecuador%
202009.pdf.
176
See Press Release, Aecon, supra note 171.
177
Financial Plan, Corporación Quiport S.A., supra note 169.
178
Press Release, Aecon, supra note 171.
179
Fernando Cabrera Diaz, Consortium Building New Quito Airport Takes Ecuador to ICSID,
INV. TREATY NEWS (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2010/02/10/consortium-building-newquito-airport-takes-ecuador-to-icsid-3/.
180
See Eva Medalla, Quito Airport Closed “Until Further Notice” - Quiport, BNAMERICAS
(Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.bnamericas.com/news/infrastructure/Quito_airport_closed_*until_
further_notice*_-_Quiport1#close.
181
Id.
182
See Diaz, supra note 179.
183
See id.
184
Gabriela Valdivieso Ortega, Análisis de la sentencia No. 003-09-SIN-CC de la Corte
Constitucional para el Período de Transición referente a los emolumentos cobrados por la
prestación del servicio del Aeropuerto Mariscal Sucre, 11 REVISTA DE DERECHO 185, 185 (2009),
available at http://repositorio.uasb.edu.ec/bitstream/10644/2118/1/RF-11-Jurisprudencia.pdf; see
also Xavier Rosales, Ecuador: The Quito Airport Case, an Uncertain Future, CORRAL & ROSALES
ABOGADOS (2009), available at
http://www.alta.aero/aviationlaw/2009/upload/presentations/XavierRosales-Corral&Rosales.pdf.
185
Diaz, supra note 179; see also Rosales, supra note 184.

85

WINTER 2014

Project Finance Investors

evaluated the lending arrangement186 and determined that the fees were
in fact taxes and therefore could not be the responsibility of a private
entity, like Quiport, to administer.187
The constitutional challenge appeared to be a political maneuver to
exact greater profit for the government by renegotiating the contract after
the deal had already closed.188 The government argued that the new
Constitution, which was not in effect at the time Quiport entered into the
contracts or began the project, could alter the agreement.189 The
Constitutional Court further held that Quiport violated Article
CCLXXXVII of the 2008 Constitution, which requires that only public
bodies can receive and utilize funds from public resources.190 Under the
concession agreement, regulated revenues (i.e., airline landing fees,
passenger departure fees, etc.) were to be distributed between parties; the
city of Quito would receive eleven percent and Quiport would keep the
remaining eighty-nine percent.191 These fees could be substantial if
Ecuador were to achieve its goal of becoming a regional hub for South
America.192 Rather than adhering to the contract or even engaging
Quiport in a discussion on the distribution of these revenues, the new
government simply declared that that these fees were public resources
that only the state could administer.193 The Constitutional Court agreed,
declaring that the fees were a public resource because they were the type
of funds that only a public institution could administer.194
The Constitutional Court attempted to legitimize its decision, not
through reason, but through enumerating procedural constitutional
provisions.195 A large portion of the opinion was a justification of the
court’s authority to find Quiport in violation of the Constitution.196 The
procedural provisions cited by the Court created a gloss of authority for
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what was otherwise a retroactive attempt to extort more money,
estimated to be at least USD $200 million, out of the project.197
D. Resolution of Risks
Despite the added expenses and costly eighteen-month delay caused
by the government’s attempt to alter the airport deal,198 Quiport sponsors
archetypically resolved the dispute.199 This resolution occurred,200 in
large part, because the stabilization clause in the contract provided for
arbitration at the World Bank and an option for recourse through BITs
between Canada and Ecuador.201 Based on the stabilization clause, the
parties reached a settlement in 2011.202
While Quiport resolved some of the largest risks, the success of the
project remains in debate.203 Only a few months after its inauguration,
people criticized the airport for its distance from the city, quirks in the
flight schedules, lack of accommodations for travelers, and the
surrounding mountain roads to which many foreigners were
unaccustomed.204 The Economist criticized the new airport for having
simply shifted the problems of the old airport, rather than solving them,
by saying, “[n]ow, the discomfort is on the ground.”205 The criticism may
have been due to the fact that the airport’s roads were still under
construction during the opening.206 Furthermore, a few months of
observation likely does not provide much insight into the long-term
success of the project.207 Regardless of the initial complaints, however,
Quiport demonstrates the types of risks investors in Ecuador may expect
to encounter and how to resolve those risks using project finance and
stabilization clauses.208
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE PROJECT FINANCERS: STRONG
STABILIZATION CLAUSES
Ecuador’s populist trend poses a significant risk to all investors in the
region, but project financiers are in a position to minimize the risk by
197
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negotiating for strong contracts that include a stabilization clause like the
one in Quiport’s agreement.209 Stabilization clauses protect investors
because the clauses allow investors “to control the future.”210
Stabilization clauses do this by shielding investors through international
and domestic enforcement as well as by providing a basis for insurance
recovery.211 Quiport’s stabilization clause was a significant reason why
the settlement and renegotiation of the airport was so successful.212
Stabilization clauses come in a variety of flavors: “freezing,”
“economic equilibrium,” and “hybrid.”213 Freezing clauses prevent any
changes in the laws that were not in place at the time of contracting from
affecting the project.214 Equilibrium clauses simply provide for the host
nation to compensate the investors for any costs resulting from the
application of changes in the law.215 A hybrid clause combines the
freezing and equilibrium approaches.216 The clauses can be narrow, such
as controlling specific taxes, or broader, such as covering all laws.217
These clauses alleviate the tension between a sovereign’s desire to
govern without foreign influence and an investors’ need for protection.218
Ecuador’s opting out of ICSID and BITs has limited the traditional
enforcement of stabilization clauses;219 however, these limitations do not
entirely negate stabilization clauses as a significant protection.220
Stabilization clauses can also be effective if the concession agreement
somehow “internationalize[s]” itself.221 For example, investors may still
conceivably enforce their contracts under international law through a
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
arbitration or through the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber
of Commerce.222
209
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In addition to international enforcement mechanisms, parties also
have the option to enforce stabilization clauses domestically.223 Domestic
law, however, is most often used as a compliment to other protections in
a contract.224
Should international and domestic enforcement of stabilization
clauses fail to protect the investor, the stabilization clause could support
an insurance claim for damages.225 Project insurance can cover both the
risks from expropriation of property as well as breaches of contractual
provisions.226 Insurance protection is important because if the host
country breaches a stabilization clause, the insurance company may
cover the investor’s losses depending upon the terms of the insurance
provisions.227 While insurance raises the aggregate transaction costs,228
savvy investors can structure the deal to pass insurance costs on to the
contracting nation and its agencies.229
In summary, stabilization clauses, such as the one that Quiport
employed, are still strong protection for investors. In populist nations
stabilization clauses provide the investor with predictable laws or
compensation that is enforceable through limited international and
domestic frameworks.230 Moreover, even if those frameworks fail,
investors can recover their damages through insurance with the support
of a stabilization clause.231
VII. CONCLUSION
Quiport revealed that investing in Ecuador and other populist nations
is feasible, even in light of the challenges populism poses.232 When the
Quiport sponsors encountered a constitutional challenge to its fee
distribution arrangement, they successfully relied on strong contractual
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provisions including a stabilization clause.233 The stabilization clause
enabled the Quiport sponsors to arbitrate the dispute at ICSID and reach
a settlement with the government of Ecuador.234 Although ICSID will no
longer be available, stabilization clauses remain a valuable protection for
future investors in Ecuador because other international and domestic
enforcement mechanisms are still available.235 Even if those features
prove unreliable, a stabilization clause, coupled with the purchase of
insurance, could establish damages for an insurance payment in the case
of any change in law or constitution.236
As a result of a stabilization clause, Quiport investors made a
potentially successful investment in Ecuador. Although foreign investors
face an even more populist government in Ecuador now, project finance
can still avoid the risks of populism.237 Through the use of a stabilization
clause, investors can approach safer investment opportunities in populist
countries, like Ecuador, just as pilots can now approach safer landings at
the new Quito airport.238
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